By Joe Magliolo

As we continue our series summarizing recent Fifth Circuit criminal opinions, the latter half of March proved to be particularly noteworthy. The Fifth Circuit addressed a range of cases, including those involving the False Claims Act, the death penalty, and several other criminal matters. As before, each case title is linked to the full opinion, and the judge who authored the Court’s opinion is highlighted in bold.

United States v. Lehew, No. 23-50569, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 879727 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025)

Issues: Appellate Waiver, Special Assessment, Sentences in Excess of Statutory Maximum.

Judge Richman, Judge Graves, Judge Ramirez (from W.D. Texas).

The Fifth Circuit considered whether a defendant’s plea waiver barred an appeal from the $5,000 special assessment the district court imposed on Trevor Lehew, under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (“JVTA”). Lehew argued this special assessment represented a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum penalties because he was indigent, and the Court failed to conduct an indigency analysis. The Court found the waiver controlled and affirmed the imposition of the special assessment.

Lehew pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor and, pursuant to a plea agreement, waived his right to appeal, which included a prohibition on appealing monetary penalties or obligations.

During his re-arraignment, the Magistrate Judge who took his plea indicated that the maximum penalties should he plead guilty could include a “$25,000 special assessment” (the Fifth Circuit noted the Magistrate Judge misspoke, as the statutory assessment for his crime is $5,000). Lehew’s PSR noted he had over $14,000 in liabilities but that he also had worked as a car mechanic with various levels of monthly income, including one month where he earned over $8,000.

At his sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Lehew to 35 years’ incarceration and imposed the $5,000 JVTA special assessment, and Lehew failed to object to its imposition.

On appeal, Lehew claimed the special assessment exceeded the maximum sentence because he was indigent at the time he was sentenced, and the JVTA indicates it should only be imposed on a non-indigent person.

The Court disagreed, and it initially distinguished Lehew’s situation from those in Paroline cases because special assessments in JVTA-eligible cases do not require causation analysis between the acts of the defendant and the harm caused to the identified victims. By contrast, it noted that maximum-sentence arguments are not an “escape hatch” to evade an appellate waiver. Lehew’s appellate waiver controlled because the district court did not completely fail to conduct an indigency analysis.

The Court’s ground for this conclusion was that, despite the lack of an explicit discussion of his finances at sentencing, Lehew’s PSR included a discussion of that subject and future earning potential. Because the Court previously held that trial courts base their decisions about assessments on the PSR, it found the appellate waiver controlled and affirmed the district court’s sentence.

United States v. Schnur, No. 23-60621, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 914341 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2025)

Issues: Second Amendment, Bruen.

Judge Smith, Judge Higginson, Judge Douglas (from S.D. Mississippi).

Defendant Jeremy Schnur challenged his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction on the grounds that, as applied to him, it violated Bruen v. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Court affirmed, holding prohibiting a felon with convictions like Schnur’s was within the nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

After a federal task force located Schnur, a wanted fugitive, with a loaded 9mm pistol, the government charged him with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Schnur filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him under Bruen. The district court denied that motion, held a bench trial with largely stipulated facts, and found him guilty.

Schnur renewed his as-applied challenge on appeal, and the Fifth Circuit focused on his underlying convictions to assess how they compared to historical analogues in an effort to determine whether he was the type of person who could be prohibited from possessing a firearm.

As for Schnur’s aggravated battery conviction, the Court observed that Schnur was convicted after “brutally attack[ing] the victim” by kicking and punching him, then stealing his cell phone. Relying on United States v. Bullock, 123 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2024), the Court reasoned that Schnur, like Bullock, was subject to the firearm prohibition with which he was charged, as the country had a longstanding tradition of disarming people with a “violent criminal history[.]” Though he did not possess a firearm in connection with his battery conviction, the Court added that Bullock’s conviction indicated he poses a threat to public safety and the orderly functioning of society.

Dealing more quickly with his other convictions, the Court explained that robbery and burglary convictions further supported the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as applied to Schnur. Citing its precedent, the Court noted that theft was a capital offense at the time of the nation’s founding, and that prohibiting Schnur from possessing a firearm, based on his two theft-related convictions, also fit within the tradition of disarming people like him.

In a brief concurrence, Judge Higginson noted his concern that a Bruen­-style historical analysis might be required in all 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) cases, and he explained his preference for the analytical approach taken by other Circuit Courts that is more deferential to legislatures that prohibit firearm possession by any felons. In the absence of such deference, he indicated the Court should provide clearer guidance to district courts on how to determine if predicate felonies for these charges remain constitutional under Bruen.

United States v. Sanders, No. 15-31114, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 926855 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025)

Issues: Death Penalty, Competency, Miranda, Suppression, Qualified Request for Attorney, Double Jeopardy, Jury Venire Composition, Voir Dire, Sufficiency of the Evidence, Death-Qualifying Venire, Victim-Impact Testimony, Federal Death Penalty Act, Cumulative Error.

Judge Richman, Judge Southwick, Judge Oldham (from W.D. Louisiana).

This was a death-penalty case where the defendant, Thomas Steven Sanders, was convicted and sentenced to death for kidnapping and murdering a child in Louisiana, following a lengthy trial that concluded in September 2014. After a variety of delays related to compiling the extensive record evidence, the Fifth Circuit heard oral argument on the case on March 2, 2020, just in advance of the COVID-19 pandemic, and issued its opinion last month. During the pendency of the appeal, then-President Biden commuted Sanders’ death sentence, which appears to have affected the Court’s analysis on several issues Sanders raised related to his sentence. On appeal, Sanders raised 12 issues, which I will summarize in turn below:

Competency to Stand Trial

Sanders first complained the district court did not sua sponte order a hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Based on a three-factor test, the Court found the district court did not err. First, as to a history of “irrational behavior,” though his attorney proffered to the district court that he was “decompensating” mentally with the stress of trial, and there was evidence at trial that he suffered from mental illness and brain damage, the jury did not find he suffered from mental illness, nor did it find that he experienced delusions or heard voices. The second factor, his demeanor at trial, did not favor Sanders because there was no evidence of any outbursts or inappropriate behavior during his trial. On the final factor, prior medical opinions of competency, the Court found that there was evidence that Sanders had brain damage, but no expert opined that he was incompetent to stand trial, and the trial court never raised any concern during the nineteen-day trial.

Motion to Suppress Admissions

Sanders argued the district court should have suppressed statements he made to state and federal investigators on three occasions the day he was arrested.

During the first interview, which took place in an FBI vehicle, Sanders admitted to killing the child’s mother, that the child witnessed it, and that he drove her to Louisiana, but he twice asked to speak with a lawyer when asked about killing the girl. Sanders, however, added that he was willing to speak with the agents about other issues. In the second interview, at the local FBI office, Sanders explained he understood his rights, provided information about the location of the mother’s body, and said the girl became “hysterical” after she witnessed her mother’s death. He also described the condition of the child’s remains and said, “She didn’t deserve that.” During the third interview, which took place at the jail where Sanders was being held, Sanders waived his rights to an attorney, but when asked about his employment, he said he wanted to speak to an attorney. The agents changed subjects, and Sanders later agreed to talk about the minor and her mother, and he admitted to killing them both.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Court affirmed its ruling. As to the first interview, the Court found that, since the agents did not ask questions about the subject on which Sanders requested an attorney, it was only a “qualified” request for counsel. The second interview was not improper because Sanders did not request counsel during it. As for the third interview, the Court found that Sanders’ request for counsel was “arguably unambiguous,” and that admitting evidence after that invocation was an error (for purposes of its analysis). But, since Sanders merely argued that admitting that evidence harmed his mitigation case at the death-penalty sentencing phase about his impaired functioning, and there was a significant amount of admissible admissions to FBI agents about his recollection of the events of the day, the admission of the evidence from the third interview did not entitle him to a new trial.

Double Jeopardy

Sanders next argued he was charged with two crimes and sentenced twice for one act in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court disagreed because the two statutes with which he was charged—interstate kidnapping resulting in death and murdering a person through the use of a firearm during a crime of violence—did not have overlapping elements, thus passing the Blockburger test.

The Court considered further whether cumulative punishments were permitted for the two offenses, as he faced two life sentences based on the two convictions. The Court here found Section 924(j), the murder charge, did not contain language like that present in another section of the same statute (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) that authorizes two sentences to be run cumulatively. But, without the express authorization of Congress to run the sentences for the crimes for which Sanders was convicted consecutively, the Court vacated one of the two life sentences.

Petit- and Grand-Jury Makeup Challenge

Sanders challenged the composition of the grand jury and petit jury pools from which jurors were pulled. He argued principally that the jury rolls from which the jurors were selected were years old, which excluded 18-21-year olds, and that there were fewer African Americans in those same pools than would be expected from the population at large.

The Court disagreed with the age-based challenge, noting previous holdings that this arrangement did not violate a defendant’s fair cross-section rights because that is not a distinct group such that temporary exclusion from jury service violates the defendant’s right to a fair trial. As for the venires’ purported lack of African Americans, the Court found that there were 10.8% fewer African Americans in the grand jury venire than in the local population. The Court held this was not such a sufficient disparity as to demonstrate systemic exclusion necessary to make a prima facie case for such a challenge. The 11.28% disparity for the petit jury venire pool was similarly insufficient for Sanders to win on these grounds.

Death-Qualifying Sanders’ Jury

Sanders next argued the district court erred by “death-qualifying” the jury (i.e., removing jurors for cause who are so opposed to the death penalty that it would substantially impair their ability to fairly serve during the sentencing phase of the trial). The Court found the district court did not err, as federal statutes permit the district court to excuse any juror who “may be unable to render impartial jury service.” It also rejected Sanders’ argument that using this process infringed on freedom of religion, because the district court asked jurors if they had religious beliefs concerning the death penalty, and this is an appropriate topic if those religious beliefs would prevent a juror from impartially applying the law.

Striking Venire Member

The Court further disagreed with Sanders’ assertion that a juror should not have been stricken, based solely on her questionnaire answers, without further, individual voir dire. The Court found that person gave what the district called “bizarre” answers to certain questions, including that she said it was God’s job to judge, she was skeptical of the criminal justice system, and that she would only potentially be fair as a juror so long as the defendant had not been “set up.” As a result, the Court found the district court did not err in striking this potential juror.

Sufficiency of the Evidence on Kidnapping Charge

Sanders asserted there was insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping charge, focusing on the portion of the statute that requires the government to prove the defendant held the kidnapped person for “ransom, reward, or other benefit.” He claimed there was no evidence that he derived any benefit from the kidnapping. The Court noted that the “gravamen” of the kidnapping charge is the “holding” of the victim and not the “benefit.” Further, there was evidence at trial that the benefit Sanders derived was silencing the only witness to the murder of the minor child’s mother. Thus, the jury could derive the benefit Sanders gained from the act of kidnapping. Further, there was evidence supporting the aggravating factors that led to Sanders’ death penalty (though the Court analyzed them only because it was unclear as to the effect of Sanders’ commutation).

Victim-Impact Testimony

Sanders argued the district court should not have permitted several witnesses to testify during the victim-impact portion of sentencing, and the Court considered the argument despite the lack of clarity on the commutation’s effect on this portion of his appeal.

It found the district court did not err by letting the minor’s sixth grade teachers testify, as the Supreme Court has recognized that, in such cases, the victim’s death presents a “unique loss to society,” and it therefore allowed non-family members to testify. Permitting the victim’s great aunt to testify and read from the victim’s journals was similarly not reversible error, given the great deal of mitigation evidence Sanders provided during this portion of his trial.

Closing Argument Error

Sanders challenged several statements from the prosecutor’s closing argument during the trial’s penalty phase. The Court repeated the lack of clarity resulting from the commutation and assessed each one. The prosecutor’s challenged comments included claims that the jurors did not know what “horrors” the victim went through during the kidnapping, that Sanders did not have impaired executive functioning, and that a certain witness’s findings were unsupported by any other evidence. The Court found there was no error as to the first two comments, because the jury could infer such horrors, particularly because Sanders told another witness that he did not want to talk about that time period, and that the second statement merely summarized what one government witness said. Though the prosecutor’s statement about the lack of evidence supporting that witness was not correct, the Court found it was not reversible error because the jury was properly instructed by the Court (and the prosecutor) about using their recollection and that the argument was not evidence.

Sanders also claimed the prosecutor improperly told the jury to ignore certain mitigation evidence because the Court found the prosecutor only indicated that the evidence might be “true” but not mitigating in Sanders’ case. Finally, the prosecutor did not err by telling the jury the victim “didn’t deserve” what happened to her, as it construed this comment as asking the jury to act as the conscience of the community, which is permissible.

Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act

Sanders next argued the Federal Death Penalty Act was unconstitutional as applied to him because he received the death penalty while others did not, the race of his victims, and juror confusion.

The Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that Sanders and the victim were both white; there was no evidence that this affected his jury’s consideration of his sentence. And a sampling of capital cases that did not result in the death penalty did not help Sanders’ case because this unpredictability does not justify “their condemnation.”

Challenge to the Death Penalty

Sanders argued his death sentences were aberrational and disproportionately severe. Though it again was unclear on the import of his commutation on this issue, the Court considered and rejected this claim.

It found that there was no reason to conduct a proportionality review of his sentence as compared to those for similar crimes, as it is not constitutionally required. As to whether his sentence was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, the jury considered mitigation evidence and made 106 separate findings on his mitigation claims. It accepted some and rejected others, including that he was remorseful or that his brain damage decreased his ability to regulate his emotions. The Court also found that he could not claim ineligibility for the death penalty based on claimed intellectual disability, as his IQ was above average, and that prior precedent did not prevent brain-damaged persons from receiving the death penalty.

Cumulative Error

Finally, the Court rejected Sanders’ cumulative error argument because it found so few errors in the district court proceedings, and not nearly enough to find cumulative error.

Judge Oldham added a concurrence through which he analyzed the historical basis for the Executive pardon and commutation process, which he commented, as applied to Sanders, was “a stain on the noble prerogative of executive mercy.”

United States, ex rel v. Peripheral Vascular Associates, No. 24-50176, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 939890 (5th Cir. Mar. 28, 2025)

Issues: False Claims Act, Double-Billing, CPT-4 Manual, Materiality, Knowledge of Falsity, Damages.

Judge Haynes, Judge Duncan, Judge Wilson (from W.D. Texas).

This is a False Claims Act (“FCA”) case concerning alleged over-billing, in which the plaintiffs won some relief at the summary judgment stage and then succeeded at other claims at trial, resulting in a $28.7 million judgment in their favor. The Fifth Circuit affirmed only the grant of summary judgment on one set of claims, but it did not accept the result of the damages trial on that issue, and it reversed summary judgment on the other set of claims and remanded for a new trial.

Relators alleged that Peripheral Vascular Associates (“PVA”), a vascular surgery practice, made false claims as to two categories of billing to Medicare – termed “Testing Only” claims and “Double Billing” claims. PVA engaged in “noninvasive vascular diagnostic studies,” which the Court also termed “vascular ultrasounds.” These ultrasounds consist of two components, a “technical component,” where a technician performs an ultrasound, and a “professional component,” where a physician reads and interprets the results of the ultrasound. These steps can be billed separately or combined into a single charge for all work completed. PVA billed the two steps together.

PVA used two programs relevant to the appeal—“Allscripts,” into which doctors would dictate their interpretation of the vascular ultrasound and sign that record prior to billing, and which contained everything PVA had done for that patient, and “MedStreaming,” which generated reports for every vascular study regardless of whether a patient had received a doctor’s interpretation of their ultrasound. PVA conceded doctors sometimes wrote and signed the MedStreaming reports only after claims had been submitted to Medicare.

The relators claimed that PVA engaged in fraud by submitting some of these global bills when only the “technical component” had been completed (which PVA conceded occurred in some cases), i.e., the “Testing Only” Claims. They also alleged the “Double Billing” claims occurred when PVA billed Medicare for the “professional component” of the test process both after a doctor interpreted the results and again when PVA submitted bills for both components of the ultrasound.

The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part, on the first two FCA elements, finding that they had demonstrated PVA submitted both types of claims that were false and “knowingly false,” and they proceeded to trial only as to materiality and damages. The jury concluded the claims were material, and it found approximately $2.7 million in damages the government suffered as a result. The district court set this aside in favor of an “interest-based” model of damages, given that PVA actually performed the services but simply billed too early for them. In this light, it accepted the plaintiffs’ model of $1.4 million in direct damages, trebled that amount, and reached a final judgment of $28.7 million based on these figures and statutory penalties.

Summary Judgment

On appeal, the Court first considered the district court’s summary judgment findings.

Summary Judgment as to Falsity

As to the falsity finding, the Court first assessed the “Testing Only” claims. It noted that the evidence established that these bills were submitted to Medicare before the patients at issue had seen a doctor, though the bills indicated that this part of the process had been completed. No report was created for these patients in MedStreaming until after PVA billed Medicare.

PVA argued that the CPT-4 Manual (which the Department of Health and Human Services adopted as a standard medical data code set) does not require a physician to complete a written report prior to billing for the professional component of the ultrasounds they performed. The Court did not find this persuasive, as the Manual states that these studies necessarily include a need for there to be “hard copy output” to be included in patient records prior to billing. PVA also claimed that signing these reports after billing Medicare for them does not mean the doctors failed to perform the work before submitting the bills. The Court similarly rejected this argument, as the evidence before it showed the PVA doctors were, other than during a brief period in 2017, submitting global bills prior to reading or interpreting them. Thus, the Court affirmed the falsity finding as to the “Testing Only” claims.

For the “Double Billing” claims, the Court identified the key question as whether the CPT-4 manual required separate reports in the systems PVA utilized. The Court found the district court improperly conflated multiple sections of the CPT-4 manual to require this from PVA, noting that the manual was not clear enough to require separate reports in Allscripts and MedStreaming to sustain the summary judgment holding on these claims, and it reversed this ruling.

Summary Judgment as to Knowledge of Falsity

Next, the Court assessed the district court’s holding that PVA knew the bills it submitted as to both types of claims were false.

The Court again affirmed the district court on the “Testing Only” claims. It found the evidence showed PVA was, at least, “conscious of a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that it could not submit global bills without completing the professional component of the ultrasounds. The evidence included documents showing PVA was aware that they could not bill for these studies until a doctor interpreted them.

The Court reversed on this element of the “Double Billing” claims. It found again the CPT-4 Manual was unclear as to whether doctors could bill for the professional portion of the ultrasound if they had entered reports in MedStreaming but not Allscripts, and it reversed the district court’s ruling on this category of claims.

Trial Challenges

Materiality

The Court initially found the plaintiffs demonstrated the claims were “material,” as required under the FCA, because expert testimony showed that if Medicare knew it had been billed for incomplete procedures, it would not have paid the relevant claims.

Is Knowledge of Materiality Required?

As to knowledge of materiality, PVA argued the jury should have been asked whether PVA submitted each claim to Medicare with knowledge that the falsity of the claim was material, effectively arguing that the FCA’s mens rea requirement applies to materiality as well as falsity. The Court disagreed, distinguishing the Supreme Court’s Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 193 (2016) decision, where the Supreme Court suggested the mental state in certain FCA cases could extend to materiality—there, where the submissions were false by omission. Instead, the Court relied on United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739, 742 (2023), finding that Schutte, like the case before it, relied on outright falsehoods and did not extend the knowledge element to the materiality element.

Damages

The Court reversed on damages. It found the district court’s reliance on the plaintiffs’ damages-expert affidavit did not abide by the “maximum recovery rule,” which required it to reduce the verdict to the maximum amount the jury could have properly awarded. The Court focused on the lack of evidence in the record to properly calculate damages, which the district court acknowledged. Since the expert’s calculations were not submitted to the jury and that expert was not subject to cross-examination, the Court held the district court should have granted a new trial on damages on the Testing Only claims at a minimum, and it reversed the damages award.

The Court then reversed on the issue of the number of false claims, though it left to the district court’s discretion whether it could identify the total amount of false claims without having to retry that issue as well.

Judge Duncan wrote a concurrence in which he questioned the constitutionality of the FCA’s provision that allows relators to bring claims on the government’s behalf. He suggested this provision violates the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which empowers the President to appoint officers of the government, while the FCA allows private parties to exert an Executive’s powers without such an appointment. He also argued the relator provision of the FCA violates the Take Care Clause, which vests in the Executive Branch the power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

United States v. Stuart, No. 23-20590, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 942373 (5th Cir. Mar. 28, 2025)

Issues: Hobbs Act Robbery, Severance of Trial, Rule 404(b), Rule 608(b), Beechum Test, Extrinsic Evidence, Confrontation Clause, Speedy Trial Act.

Judge Smith, Judge Clement, Judge Duncan (from S.D. Texas).

The Fifth Circuit considered a variety of issues stemming from Stuart’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses after he engaged in armed robberies of two convenience stores and was caught with a firearm in 2019.

While waiting for trial, in 2020, Stuart strangled a female prison guard, and a grand jury also indicted him for that offense.

The district court consolidated the robbery and firearm indictment with the assault charge and intended to try the two together. At trial, the government referred to the assault charge during its opening statement, though it never introduced any evidence concerning that incident. During his opening statement, Stuart (representing himself pro se) contested how the government could identify him as possessing the relevant firearm during a domestic violence incident that predated the robberies or as the person who committed the subsequent robberies.

During the trial, the government established through victim testimony that Stuart was the robber during both charged offenses. The first victim clerk testified that Stuart, after hitting him with his gun, then grabbed the store’s weapon and shot the clerk multiple times. Stuart again contested that the video surveillance footage showed him as the robber.

The second clerk, under indictment for state felony assault and attempted kidnapping charges and wearing an orange jumpsuit during trial, also identified Stuart as the robber of the convenience store where he was working. The prosecution established this clerk was facing felony charges, and Stuart asked him if he expected “favors” from the federal government, but the Court forbade Stuart from asking about the witness’s specific charges.

The gun Stuart used during the robberies was the same gun he used during a previous domestic violence incident. Because Stuart contested that he committed that assault or the robberies involving the same firearm, the district court permitted the government to introduce testimony about the domestic violence incident through a police officer who recovered a shell casing from the scene that matched the gun Stuart used during the robberies and through the victim, who testified that she was hiding from Stuart and heard a gun go off during the incident.

Towards the end of the trial, the district court severed the prison-assault charge, finding that it would be unduly prejudicial to the jury’s consideration of the robbery and firearm charges. At this point, the government had introduced no evidence concerning this assault, and the district court instructed the jury to “disregard any mention” of the assault and not to let it affect its judgment.

Stuart was convicted on all remaining charges and now represented by appellate counsel, appealed multiple issues, as follows:

Admission of Evidence Concerning Domestic Violence Incident Under Rule 404(b)

Stuart first argued the district court should not have admitted evidence concerning the domestic violence incident that predated the robberies, as he contended it was irrelevant and inflamed the jury. The Court disagreed, finding that the trial court had not violated either element of the Beechum Test.

As to the first step, since Stuart’s central defense was whether he committed the robberies, the Court found the evidence was relevant to the question of his identity. Even though the offenses were dissimilar, the relevancy of the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is determined by the issue to which the extrinsic evidence is directed—here, his identity, because Stuart used the same firearm on all three occasions.

The district court also met the second Beechum step, whether the evidence “substantially outweighed” its probative value, because, again, Stuart made identity the central issue, and the government only delved into the details of that incident after Stuart contested it and his identity vehemently at trial. As the district court also told the jury that it could consider evidence of that incident for the limited purpose of determining Stuart’s identity for the crimes at issue, it did not err under Rule 404(b).

Statements about Prison Assault

Stuart next challenged the statements about the prison assault charge that the district court ultimately severed from his trial. The Court reviewed this issue for plain error because Stuart failed to object to any aspect of it at trial and found any error was harmless. This was because there was no mention of the assault after opening statements, and the district court gave an appropriate limiting statement to the jury concerning that statement.

Confrontation Clause

Stuart argued the district court violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because he was not permitted to ask the second clerk victim about the specific charges he was facing in state court. The Court noted the Confrontation Clause gives a defendant the “opportunity” for effective cross-examination, but that this right is not unlimited. He could not show the jury would have received a different impression of the witness’s credibility because the government elicited evidence that he was facing state charges, the witness was wearing a jumpsuit, and the defendant could ask if he was expecting favors for his testimony.

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), therefore, the Court held the evidence was not admissible, and it further held that the probative value of those charges was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

Speedy Trial

Finally, Stuart argued his speedy trial rights were violated, given the time lapse between his April 2019 indictment and March 2023 trial. The Court disagreed, as many of the delays were caused by the defendant seeking continuances, filing frivolous motions, refusing to submit to a mental evaluation, and strangling a prison officer. Given that he could not show prejudice, the Court held Stuart’s rights to a speedy trial were not violated.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or any of their respective affiliates. This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For questions related to these cases, please contact a member of the Investigations & White Collar Defense practice.

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