By Clinton Butler

For decades, Texas mineral owners, royalty holders, and their successors have grappled with a deceptively simple question: when an antiquated deed uses a “double fraction” involving 1/8, does 1/8 carry its ordinary arithmetical value, or does it refer to the entire mineral estate?

The Van Dyke Presumption

In Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, decided in February 2023, the Court examined a 1924 deed reserving “one-half of one-eighth” of all minerals and mineral rights. Building on its earlier decision in Hysaw v. Dawkins, the Court recognized that 1/8 was historically used as a term of art to describe the entire mineral estate—a product of the widespread but mistaken belief that a lessor retained only a 1/8 interest after executing an oil-and-gas lease. The Court held that when courts encounter a double fraction involving 1/8 in an antiquated mineral instrument, they must “begin” with a presumption that 1/8 reflects the entire mineral estate. Thus, the Court found that the interest at issue was a floating 1/2 rather than a fixed 1/16. At the same time, though, the Court emphasized that the “presumption is readily and genuinely rebuttable” through textual indicia within the deed itself. However, the Court found nothing in the text that could overcome the presumption, leaving the question of what a successful rebuttal might look like for another day.

Clifton Instructs When the Presumption can be Rebutted

That day arrived with Clifton v. Johnson, decided by the Court this past March. There, a 1951 deed conveyed “an undivided one in one hundred and twenty-eighth (1/128) interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals” under certain tracts in Reeves County. A later provision granted a “1/128 (1/16 of the usual 1/8 royalty) part of all the oil, gas, and other minerals taken and saved under” future leases. Unlike in Van Dyke, where the double fraction stood alone, the Clifton deed expressly multiplied the fractions to arrive at a single product—1/128. The Court found that the parenthetical containing the double fraction was explanatory—it showed how the parties reached their 1/128 figure, not that 1/8 was being used as a term of art. Thus, the Court held the Van Dyke presumption was “necessarily rebutted.”

Clifton Elevates the Presumed-Grant Doctrine to New Heights

Maybe more importantly, Clifton highlighted the critical role of the presumed-grant doctrine in double-fraction disputes. In Van Dyke, the Court described two “distinct paths” to resolving mineral-interest ownership: deed construction and the presumed-grant doctrine. The Court in Van Dyke found that the presumed-grant doctrine could serve to “remove any remaining doubts” concerning a deed’s interpretation. But Clifton went a step further and found that the two paths “sit alongside” each other, asking the same fundamental question—“who owns this property today?”—through entirely different lenses. Where the double-fraction presumption examines textual meaning, the presumed-grant doctrine looks to real-world conduct: how have the parties treated the royalty interests at issue? And critically, the Court took a footnote from Van Dyke and brought it to center-stage, holding that “when the presumed-grant doctrine clearly applies, a court could dispense with the deed-construction analysis altogether.” Therefore, no matter what the deed actually says, if the longstanding conduct of the parties is contrary to the language in the deed, the conduct will trump the language of the deed and will dictate how the property is owned.

The Supreme Court quickly reinforced this holding in Boren Descendants v. Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd., decided in April 2026, where the court of appeals had declined to consider the presumed-grant doctrine on jurisdictional grounds. The Court reversed, holding that courts “need” to “consider both the relevant instrument’s text and, if properly raised, the presumed-grant doctrine.” In fact, the Court found it is “hard to imagine how a properly lodged presumed-grant-doctrine issue could be severed from an appeal involving the textual analysis of a deed.”

What This Means for Mineral Owners

Clifton provides at least one example of when the Van Dyke presumption is rebutted: the double-fraction is expressed “as a multiplied product.” Thus, if your mineral deed similarly multiplies a double fraction into a single product, you likely have a viable argument that the Van Dyke presumption has been rebutted and the interest at issue is properly interpreted as a fixed interest rather than floating. But as Clifton instructs, the text of the deed matters, and how the parties actually lived under it. Assuming your deed rebuts the Van Dyke presumption with Clifton-esque language, the parties’ conduct might actually control and “dispense with the deed-construction analysis altogether.” Therefore, it is critically important to consider the language used in your pertinent deed as well as how the parties have treated the interests at issue since its creation in order to properly discern the interest at issue.

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